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A comparative linguistic analysis of statements by the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) in BP plc’s published annual report of 2010. 
 
Gavin D’Northwood (Durham University Business School) 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines statements by the Chairman and CEO of BP plc from the company’s 
2010 annual report. Working on the premise that the reputational fallout from the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in April 2010 would have heightened the need for the company to engage in 
reader positioning through its annual report to protect and repair the company’s legitimacy, it 
is suggested that differences would manifest in the approach to and strength of that 
positioning because the Chairman and CEO occupy different roles. Following M.A.K. 
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics framework, a comparative register analysis was 
undertaken of the respective statements of the Chairman and CEO of BP plc from the 
company’s 2010 annual report. This concentrates on relevant aspects of the interpersonal 
metafunction, Tenor and the experiential metafunction, Field. Reviewing the Tenor of each 
statement framed an examination of how the Chairman and CEO each present to the reader 
through their respective statements, i.e. the persona which comes across through lexico-
grammatical choices and how this is likely to impact upon reader interpretations. Each 
persona was drawn through interpretation of stance, personalisation, social distance and 
standing. Reviewing the Field of each statement framed an examination of each statement’s 
angle of representation through the characterisation of events/entities and elements of agency 
and affectedness. Particular consideration was given to how connections are made or avoided 
between participants through clausal structures, evidence of agency through transactional and 
non-transactional actor roles and agent deletion/de-emphasis through intransitive and passive 
grammatical constructions. The findings from this comparative register analysis were 
revisited and informed by corpus analysis of the two statements and of two additional larger-
scale corpora constructed from Chairman and CEO statements extracted from the annual 
reports of 25 FTSE100 companies published in 2013. The findings suggest that readers’ 
perceptions are shaped by the statements of the Chairman and CEO of BP plc in the 
company’s 2010 annual report, but similarities and differences are apparent in the way this 
positioning is engineered. Broader corpus analysis suggests that these similarities and 
differences are not localised to BP plc. 
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Introduction 
 
Historically, company annual reports were primarily comprised of financial statements but 
their communicative significance has grown and with it their narrative content (O’Regan, 
2008). Average length has doubled since 1996 to 103 pages (Deloitte, 2012) amid recognition 
that financial statements alone cannot adequately capture a company’s performance and 
prospects. Much of this is unregulated and given voluntarily, so writers have freedom to 
express themselves. This invites ‘impression management’ (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) and 
so the potential for readers to be positioned into particular interpretations and ways of 
thinking.  
 
This paper examines statements published by the Chairman and CEO of BP plc as key 
disclosures foregrounded within the company’s 2010 annual report. It is plausible that the 
fallout from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 (hereafter referred to as Deepwater 
Horizon) would have heightened the need for reader positioning and that differences would 
manifest in the approach to and strength of positioning because the Chairman and CEO 
traditionally occupy different roles within the company. Whether and if so how readers are 
positioned is investigated through a comparative register analysis of the respective statements 
of the Chairman and CEO from BP plc’s 2010 annual report following M.A.K. Halliday’s 
Systemic Functional Linguistic framework. Whether the Chairman and CEO of BP plc took 
different approaches to this is further investigated through the comparative register analysis. 
Whether then such findings may apply more broadly across UK-listed companies is 
investigated through larger-scale corpus analysis. 
 
Literature and rationale 
 
Rachel Carson’s seminal publication Silent Spring (1962) sought to raise public awareness of 
the devastating environmental effects of the worldwide use of the pesticide 
dichlorodiphenytrichloroethane (DDT). This is commonly attributed with starting the 
environmental movement, at least in the USA, although Buhr (2002, p.59) citing a study by 
Neuzil and Kovarik (1996) claimed that “environmental and social controversies have been 
troubling the public for centuries”. Whatever the origins, it seems that the level of recent 
media coverage devoted to environmental concerns, coupled with the higher placing of 
environmental matters on the political agenda, have precipitated much greater public 
awareness. This is corroborated by Dillard (2007) who claimed the criticality of 
environmental sustainability is more widely recognised by society; and by Dixon et al (2005) 
who maintained that environmental awareness, which can materially affect companies, has 
been growing for twenty years in tandem with membership levels of environmental pressure 
groups. Green activism in the UK has grown steadily from around 1970 with the inception 
and increasing memberships of organisations such as the Green Party, Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund (Campbell, Craven and Shrives, 2003). Public opinion 
may be volatile but “environment concern is an enduring issue” and “environmental activism 
is increasingly diverse, widespread, effective and well-informed” (Gray and Bebbington 
2001, p.33). 
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Organisations do not stand alone but are components of a larger social system upon which 
they are dependent for continuing support (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990). Parsons (1956) argued that because organisations consume society’s resources, 
resources for which presumably alternative uses could be found, then society necessarily 
evaluates how appropriate, useful and ‘legitimate’ an organisation’s activities are with respect 
to those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Legitimacy denotes a state whereby the 
“means and ends” of an organisation “appear to conform to social norms, values and 
expectations” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; cited in Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, p.177). An 
organisation that has legitimacy justifies to society its continued right to resources and to 
exist (Maurer, 1971; Brown and Deegan, 1998), that its goals, activities and value system are 
congruent with society’s expectations and thereby legitimate (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Lindblom, 1994). 
Societal norms, values and expectations are not fixed (Sethi, 1977) and organisations must be 
responsive to this. If a disparity exists between respective value systems - organisation and 
public - then that organisation’s legitimacy will be under threat (Lindblom 1994). Failure to 
comply with societal expectations, i.e. between how society believes an organisation should 
act and how it is perceived that the organisation has acted, will inevitably lead to a 
‘legitimacy gap’ (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). Adverse consequences follow with the 
restriction of, and in the worst cases withdrawal of community support (Deegan, 2007). 
Organisations may seek to counter legitimacy threats through communication strategies 
designed to “influence the public’s perception towards their operations” and “influence 
corporate image or reputation” (Dixon et al, 2005, p.704; Deegan, 2002).  
Managers will take action to build legitimacy, maintain legitimacy and thereby negate any 
threats to that resource, or repair legitimacy where the damage has already been done 
(Suchman 1995; Campbell et al., 2002). Aims vary from demonstrating changed behaviour to 
correcting stakeholder misperceptions or simply changing the focus of attention (Warsame et 
al., 2002:24). Whatever the specific aim, effective legitimation strategies rely upon targeted 
disclosures of information to relevant publics (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Van Staden and 
Hooks, 2007). “Legitimacy is assumed to be influenced by disclosures of information and not 
simply by (undisclosed) changes in corporate actions” (Newson and Deegan 2002, p.185; 
Deegan 2007, pp.135-136), thus all legitimation strategies are reliant upon communication 
(Deegan, 2007). With increasing calls for companies to demonstrate satisfactory performance 
vis-à-vis the environmental domain (Deegan, 2007), companies across many industry sectors 
are choosing to publish significant amounts of environmental information generally (Van 
Staden and Hooks, 2007) and arguably in response to specific legitimacy threats (see, for 
example, Guthrie and Parker, 1990, Patten, 1992 and Warsame et al., 2002).  
So, for a company to be ‘socially legitimate’ its business and conduct must appear to conform 
to the expectations of society (Suchman,1995; Dowling & Pfeffer,1975). A company’s 
legitimacy will be under threat if a disparity exists between the respective value systems of 
the company and society (Lindblom,1994). ‘Deepwater Horizon’ was hugely damaging to the 
environment and economy of the area effected and consequently BP plc which suffered 
significant reputational damage from negative media coverage, vast reparatory fines (BP plc 
put aside $7.8bn to cover claims – BBC news online,28/6/14), a record US criminal fine 
(BBC News Online,15/11/12) and a lengthy ban on US federal contracts (BBC News 
Online,13/8/13). This evidences a legitimacy threat. 
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Legitimacy theory maintains that a company will take action to repair legitimacy threats 
(Campbell et al., 2002), with disclosures seen as a key mechanism by which a company can 
influence external perceptions (Deegan, 2007; Dixon et al., 2005; Suchman, 1995). Much 
accounting research in this context has employed ‘content analysis’ (see Krippendorff, 2012) 
to derive a quantitative determination of relevant disclosure volumes based on word counts, 
sentence counts or page proportions (e.g. Campbell et al., 2002; Brown and Deegan, 1998; 
Patten, 1992, etc.). Studies often assume that increased disclosure volumes equate to 
increased attention given by organisations to gaining, maintaining or repairing legitimacy as 
appropriate. This paper, however, takes a different approach. Assumptions are not predicated 
on disclosures volumes. Through close examination of selected disclosures - respective 
statements of the Chairman and CEO from BP plc’s Annual Report 2010 - lexico-
grammatical choices will be revealed through which communicative meaning can be 
interpreted. Essentially this paper seeks to examine how each statement operates lexico-
grammatically to shape readers’ perceptions.  
 
BP plc has a unitary board system comprised of executive and non-executive directors who 
collectively manage the company on behalf of its shareholders. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) maintains that responsibilities should be clearly divided between a 
Chairman who runs the board and a separate CEO who runs the company (Mallin, 2013). The 
Chairman should be an independent outsider (Monks & Minow, 2004) who, with the non-
executive directors, acts as a check on the authority of the executive (Solomon, 2013). It was 
anticipated therefore that differences would present between the Chairman and CEO in terms 
of ideologies conveyed and reader positioning. These form additional worthwhile points of 
investigation, specifically whether similarities and differences between the two statements are 
evident and whether those similarities and differences can be observed more broadly across 
UK-listed companies.  
 
Method 
 
BP plc was sampled specifically because of Deepwater Horizon, the anticipated threat which 
this caused to BP plc’s legitimacy and the assumption following the literature that BP plc’s 
managers would seek to respond to this threat and repair the company’s legitimacy through 
disclosures. It is recognised that disclosures are made through various mechanisms but for 
practical purposes the focus here was restricted to annual report statements. Previous studies 
have pragmatically relied upon annual reports as a readily available and comparable data 
source (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; Campbell 2004). For reasons of proximity to Deepwater 
Horizon the dataset for comparative register analysis, as informed by localised corpus 
analysis, comprised statements made by the Chairman (Text 1) and CEO (Text 2) from BP 
plc’s 2010 annual report. 
 
Functional grammar focuses on explaining language use in terms of meaning (Hewings, 
2006). M.A.K. Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistic framework provides a systematic 
way of describing and analysing the links between lexico-grammatical choice and 
sociocultural context (O’Halloran, 2006). It is suited to an investigation involving close text 
analysis to ascertain ideological bias (O’Halloran, 2006). Within Halliday’s framework 
linguistic communications are seen as simultaneously serving three metafunctions of 
meaning: interpersonal, which is concerned with social interaction and exchange of views; 
experiential, which is concerned with the representation or construal of events and 
experiences; and textual, which is concerned with conveying a coherent message through 
information flow and packaging (Coffin, 2006; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). These 
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functions of communication are realised by lexico-grammatical forms which reflect and 
construct three overarching aspects of a communicative event: tenor (interpersonal 
metafunction), field (experiential metafunction) and mode (textual metafunction) (Coffin, 
2006). Lexico-grammatical modes of meaning are thus directly related to aspects of the social 
setting (O’Halloran, 2006). 
 
Following Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistic framework, a comparative register 
analysis was undertaken of both statements. This concentrated on relevant aspects of tenor 
and field as the metafunctions of most significance to this investigation.  
 
Tenor is primarily concerned with social roles, relationships and attitudes (Coffin, 2006). 
Determining the tenor of each statement framed an assessment of how the Chairman and 
CEO each present to the reader, i.e. the persona which comes across through the lexico-
grammar and how this is likely to impact upon reader interpretations. As non-interactive 
texts, each persona was made visible through interpretation of ‘stance’ (epistemic modality, 
deontic modality and attitude) (O’Halloran, 2006), personalisation and social distance 
(personalising pronouns, directives, colloquialisms, evaluative language) and standing 
(attribution, citation, evaluative language) (Coffin, 2006).  
 
Field covers the topic or activity and affects the way grammar and lexis is used by, for 
example, influencing a writer’s choice of grammatical processes and participants and the 
degree of technical lexis used (Coffin, 2006). Determining the field of each statement 
involved an assessment of angles of representation in each statement through the 
characterisation of events/entities and elements of agency and affectedness. In particular this 
examined how connections are made or avoided between participants through clausal 
structures, evidence of agency through transactional and non-transactional actor roles and 
agent deletion/de-emphasis through intransitive and passive constructions (Coffin, 2006). 
 
It was recognised that this comparative register analysis, built from the author’s subjective 
selection and interpretation of the material, cannot possibly be value free and so would 
inevitably be subject to partiality (O’Halloran, 2006). Whilst objectivity has been strived for, 
the author may have unwittingly selected parts of each statement which fit he author’s 
argument or corroborate the author’s interpretation whilst missing features which do not 
(Widdowson, 1995; cited in Coffin et al., 2010, p.121). A concordancer can be used to find 
lexico-grammatical patterns of meaning objectively within a single text or across large 
corpora of texts. Corpus analysis would thus add rigour to the comparative register analysis 
by objectively pointing to regularities in each statement (O’Halloran, 2006) and so acting as a 
check against subjective over-interpretation (Coffin & O’Halloran, 2005). The two 
approaches – comparative register analysis and corpus analysis – are compatible because both 
see language as operating within particular contexts, in contrast to grammatical paradigms 
which isolate language from its use (Hewings, 2006).  
 
Corpus analysis was thus undertaken of Texts 1 and 2 included in the comparative register 
analysis. Texts 1 and 2 were each uploaded separately to a concordance software package, 
‘MonoConc Pro’, which generated lists of frequently occurring words for each text to 
facilitate the location of clustering and objectively render patterns of ‘stance’ more visible 
(Coffin and O’Halloran, 2005) for comparison with prior interpretations. In addition, 
attitudinal indicators were sought through consideration of co-text before and after frequently 
occurring words and searches for modals, personal pronouns and attitudinally charged terms 
 6 
 
identified from the comparative register analysis. The comparative register analysis was then 
revisited and revised in light of the corpus analysis. 
 
Larger scale corpus analysis would determine if similarities and differences could be 
observed more broadly across UK-listed companies or if the statements from BP plc’s 2010 
Annual Report are atypical. Two additional corpora were compiled from Chairman and CEO 
statements extracted from the 2013 annual reports of 25 UK-listed companies chosen 
alphabetically from the FTSE100 (subject to six exclusions where annual reports did not 
include individual statements by the Chairman and CEO). These were uploaded to the same 
concordance software package, ‘MonoConc Pro’, and word-frequency lists were compiled for 
‘Corpus 1 (Chairman)’ and ‘Corpus 2 (CEO)’. These lists were then compared and contrasted 
with the preceding data from Text 1 and Text 2.  
 
Findings 
 
The following findings are drawn from the comparative register analysis informed by corpus 
analysis of Text 1 and Text 2. Numbers given in brackets relate to line numbers for each text 
(see appendices).  
 
Tenor 
 
A writer’s stance denotes commitment to a particular meaning (O’Halloran, 2006). The 
Chairman strongly positions readers through his stance, which is expressed through modality. 
When a sentence expresses a degree of likelihood it has epistemic modality (O’Halloran, 
2006). Here, epistemic modality expresses certainty through the modal finite “will” (x11: 
0.7083% of Text 1) and by modification of modal finites “should” and “will” by the modal 
adverb “never”, tempered somewhat by occasional use of the less certain modal finite “can”. 
When a sentence expresses permission, obligation or necessity it has deontic modality 
(O’Halloran, 2006). Here, deontic modality strongly expresses necessity and obligation 
through modal finites “will” (x4: 0.2576%), “would” and “must”.  
 
Positioning by the CEO through stance is comparatively diluted. Epistemic modality 
expresses varying degrees of certainty through a scale of modal finites from “will” (strong 
modality) to “may” and “can” (weaker modality), although “will” is most prominent (x12: 
0.5602% of Text 2) and several instances of modification by the modal adverbs “never” and 
“not” add strength. Instances of deontic modal meanings are limited and so deontic modality 
is comparatively weak. 
 
The Chairman’s opening tone is conciliatory, although perhaps mindful of legal constraints is 
not apologetic. This should engineer some solidarity with potential readers, employees 
certainly, although arguably less so with respect to the target shareholder audience if their 
interests are more financial than social. The CEO’s opening tone is similarly conciliatory. 
There is even an apology, albeit for the “grief felt by their families” (Text 2: 6) rather than for 
the “accident”. This paragraph is relatively short so that less attention is given to Deepwater 
Horizon and is arguably less effective therefore in engineering solidarity with readers. 
However, the CEO may well have found solidarity with shareholders by turning his attention 
to the “corporate (financial?) crisis” (Text 2: 10), by outlining the steps taken to mitigate the 
financial damage to BP plc and by recognising BP plc’s “fundamental purpose is to create 
value for shareholders” (Text 2: 164-165). 
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The Chairman’s attitude is positive throughout concerning BP plc’s role in dealing with the 
crisis. Successes are attributed to BP plc’s interventions and potential negatives are turned 
into positives. The CEO’s attitude is similarly positive. The negative of “divesting roughly 
half of our US refining capacity” (Text 2: 110-111) is explained away as refocusing on BP 
plc’s competitive advantage (Text 2: 111-113) (with hindsight this seems like ‘spin’ given BP 
plc’s lengthy ban re US federal contracts (BBC News online, 13/8/13)). The CEO’s statement 
differs in its treatment of successes, the credit for which is shared, although reference to 
“Transocean” as the “rig’s owner” (Text 2: 21-22) might be interpreted as a subtle attempt to 
deflect blame from BP plc. Would readers perceive “Transocean” as responsible for what 
occurs on its rig? Semantic prosody is evident in both statements through positively charged 
terms, positioning readers by showcasing BP plc in a good light. Counter-intuitively, the 
CEO report makes comparatively greater use of the negatively charged “not” (x6: 0.2801% 
cf. x2: 0.1288%).  
 
The Chairman reveals his presence through the personal pronoun “I” and by directly 
addressing readers through second person pronouns “you/your” which mimic personal 
contact typical of conversation (Coffin, 2006), though not in demonstrably friendly/familiar 
terms. First person pronouns “we”, “us” and “our” serve to ‘include’ readers. These markers 
establish closeness and solidarity but perversely the “you” declarative (Text 1: 118) separates 
BP plc from its shareholders. The language is direct and exhibits an unfamiliar, business-like 
style. There are no casual/colloquial words/phrases, no contractions. No friendly, informal 
acquaintance is implied between writer and reader. This serves to widen the proximity 
between writer and reader. 
 
The CEO arguably employs “I” in more familiar terms with reference to personal anecdotes 
and feelings. Occasional colloquialism is also apparent and repeat references to “people” 
(x11: 0.5135%) emphasises human concerns. Intimacy is built in a conversational way 
through which the CEO’s pseudo-familiar presence is revealed. Combined with extensive use 
of inclusive first person pronouns “we”, “us” and “our” the CEO’s statement exhibits a 
greater degree of “synthetic personalisation” (O’Halloran, 2006, p.30). This could position 
the reader on the CEO’s side. 
 
It was anticipated that the Chairman, “an independent outsider” (Monks & Minow, 2004, 
p.242), might identify more with readers and less with BP plc. However, through repetition of 
“we” the Chairman positions himself as a company insider. “We” is not used here in an 
inclusive sense; readers are kept at arm’s length – “you/your”. 
 
Both Chairman and CEO carry ‘standing’ from their positions. Both are expert witnesses with 
inside knowledge which readers do not possess, extensive media coverage notwithstanding. 
Both take responsibility for their material; there is no reliance on others for supporting 
evidence. However, differences manifest in their language use. The Chairman’s statement is 
formal and informative, not evaluative. The CEO’s statement is less formal but as 
informative whilst exhibiting some evaluative aspects. Declarative statements by the 
Chairman are non-negotiable whereas the CEO is often less assertive, leaving some room for 
readers to negotiate.  
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Field 
 
Given the intense public scrutiny it was anticipated that connections between participants 
might be avoided through intransitive clauses - to deflect responsibility away from BP plc - 
and foregrounding of participants might be avoided through passives. Both enable the 
removal of actors thereby avoiding representing connections in the world (O’Halloran, 2006). 
Both are evident, though used sparingly, in the CEO’s statement. For example, the CEO 
avoids describing BP plc as agentive vis-à-vis Deepwater Horizon – through an intransitive 
structure (Text 2: 23-24) effectively the rig just sank with no external agent responsible. The 
CEO further avoids taking credit for the response through a short passive (Text 2: 24), not 
perhaps out of modesty but to avoid making a connection between the spill in the first place. 
Tactically these suppress the company’s agency, mitigating potentially negative evaluations 
(Coffin, 2006). This approach contrasts with the Chairman who avoids intransitive clauses 
and passives and who clearly portrays the company as a transactional actor and so agentive in 
dealing with the spill and its aftermath (although not its cause!). The CEO’s statement does 
not foreground BP plc as clearly and so takes less direct credit – this might have anticipated 
this in reverse given the Chairman (outsider) vs. CEO (insider) dynamic. Neither statement 
portrays BP plc as agentive with reference to the spill; BP plc’s role here is deleted/de-
emphasised through grammatical structures. 
 
Both statements conform to the principle of end-weight whereby long/complex elements are 
placed at clause-end. Early placing of the main verb in clauses is a particular feature of 
conversation (O’Halloran, 2006; Biber et al., 2009) and lends each statement a conversational 
quality. This adds to the feel of synthetic personalisation attributed above to the use of 
inclusive first person pronouns.  
 
Broader corpus analysis 
 
As word counts vary between each corpus there is little value in comparing absolute figures. 
Word-frequency percentage values provide relative measures for comparison:  
 
 
 
Text 1 exhibits much higher modality than the ‘norm’ given by Corpus 1 through “will” 
(greater by a factor of x2.39), “must” (x7.04) and “can” (x2.12). Thus, Text 1 evidences 
stronger reader positioning than is the norm. Linked to the timing of Text 1 relative to Corpus 
1 (2010 cf. 2013) the difference may be explained by a legitimacy-based motive, i.e. because 
of the threat posed by Deepwater Horizon Text 1 exhibits more focussed reader positioning to 
repair BP plc’s legitimacy.  
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Text 2 and Corpus 2 present a similar picture for CEO statements through “will” (x1.47) and 
“can” (x5.92), and may be explained by the same legitimacy-based motive. Interestingly, 
“must” features more prominently in reports by Chairs (Corpus 1, 0.0549%) than by CEOs 
(Corpus 2, 0.0253%), the latter presenting as less assertive with reduced modality. The 
contrast is stark in comparing Text 1 which relies heavily on “must” for its strength of 
modality, particularly deontic (0.3863%), and Text 2 in which “must” does not feature (0% 
based on minimum count of ‘3’).  
 
Authorial presence is revealed through “I” and “we”. Both Text 1 and Text 2 employ “we” 
significantly more than the norms established by Corpora 1 and 2. The writers may have felt 
the need to work harder to bring readers into close proximity to repair legitimacy. Text 1 is 
relatively close to the norm re “I” (0.4507% cf. 0.5526%). Text 2, however, employs “I” to a 
significantly greater extent (0.5526% cf. 0.2001%). This fits with earlier findings of 
intimacy/familiarity apparent in Text 2. This synthetic personalisation potentially has a 
positioning effect on readers which again might be explained by the need to repair BP plc’s 
legitimacy.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The findings from this investigation suggest that readers’ perceptions are shaped by the 
statements of the Chairman and CEO respectively from BP plc’s 2010 annual report, but that 
similarities and differences are apparent in the way this positioning is engineered and more 
broadly with reference to larger-scale corpora.   
 
Both statements engineer strong reader positioning but do so in different ways. Each writer’s 
subjective presence is revealed, and readers are brought into close proximity, through 
extensive use of personal pronouns. The Chairman’s statement relies much more on stance 
than on synthetic personalisation. Conversely, the CEO report relies more on synthetic 
personalisation than on stance. The Chairman actually addresses the reader directly, 
mimicking conversation, but it is the CEO’s statement which exhibits more synthetic 
personalisation. 
 
Both writers are keen to protect BP plc vis-à-vis Deepwater Horizon. The Chairman’s 
statement de-emphasises BP plc’s role by making the “accident” agentive and so responsible. 
The CEO’s statement suppresses BP plc’s agency through occasional use of intransitive and 
passive clauses. The Chairman’s statement clearly identifies BP plc as agentive in dealing 
with the crisis whereas the CEO’s report is more circumspect in taking credit. Both 
statements are attitudinally positive re BP plc’s role in dealing with the crisis, although the 
CEO’s statement differs in sharing attribution of successes. Both statements employ terms 
with positive polarity to assist in engineering a positive feel/attitude. 
 
Future research which might add to this paper’s findings would be welcomed. It may be 
instructive to complete a full comparative register analysis across all three metafunctions, 
rather than restrict the focus to the salient aspects of two metafunctions as here, as the three 
metafunctions work together in articulation. A more detailed examination of collocations 
drawn from corpus analysis would add further depth to the interpretations made. Constraints 
of time and technical skill necessarily limited the broader corpus analysis to a comparison of 
word-frequencies – sophisticated grammatical tagging by a linguist would enable a more in-
depth study of the broader corporate reporting picture. The method employed in this study 
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might be repeated longitudinally for a single company to see if changes might be observed 
over time given changes in personnel. 
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Text 1 – Chairman’s letter (formatted) 
 
1 Chairman’s letter 
2 Dear fellow shareholder 
3 2010 was a profoundly painful and testing year. In April, a tragic accident on the  
4 Deepwater Horizon rig claimed the lives of 11 men and injured others. Above all 
5 else, I want to remember those men, and say that our thoughts remain with their 
6 families and friends. BP’s priority is to ensure that the people who work for us, and 
7 with us, return home safely. The accident should never have happened. We are 
8 shocked and saddened that it did. 
  
9 The spill that resulted caused widespread pollution. Our response has been  
10 unprecedented in scale, and we are determined to live up to our commitments in the 
11 Gulf. We will also do everything necessary to ensure BP is a company that can be 
12 trusted by shareholders and communities around the world. 
  
13 In the days after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico the company faced a complex  
14 and fast-changing crisis. With oil escaping into the ocean, uncertainty grew around 
15 our ability to seal the well and restore the areas affected. This was an intense 
16 period, with the situation worsening almost daily. Our meeting with President 
17 Obama on 16 June 2010 provided reassurance to the US government that BP 
18 would do the right thing in the Gulf, and this marked a turning point. Through 
19 diligence and invention, our teams stopped the flow of oil in July and completed 
20 relief-well operations in September. 
  
21 During these difficult days your board focused on three critical objectives. 
  
22 First, we ensured the response team had the resources it required to stop the leak,  
23 contain and clean up the damage, and provide financial support to those affected. 
24 This was an unprecedented response to an industrial accident, with some 48,000 
25 people involved at the height of the effort. We have set up a $20-billion fund to show 
26 our willingness and capacity to pay all legitimate claims for compensation. For the 
27 long term, we have committed $500 million to a 10-year independent research 
 15 
 
28 programme that will examine the environmental impact of the oil spilled and 
29 dispersants used. BP will continue to help restore the environment and economy of 
30 the Gulf, however long that takes. 
  
31 Second, we resolved to understand what happened on and below the Deepwater  
32 Horizon, to apply the lessons learned and to make our findings available publicly. 
33 BP’s comprehensive internal investigation concluded that a sequence of failures 
34 involving a number of different parties led to the explosion and fire. 
  
35 We are implementing the report’s recommendations. We have established a  
36 powerful safety and operational risk function, and we have enhanced risk 
37 management through the restructuring of our upstream business. We are also 
38 conducting a wide-ranging review of when and how we outsource operations. 
  
39 Third, we moved to secure the long-term future of BP and our capacity to meet our 
40 financial responsibilities in the Gulf of Mexico. Decisive action was required here 
41 because events in the US led to a crisis of confidence in BP within the financial 
42 markets. In response, we made the difficult decision to cancel three dividend 
43 payments. We do not underestimate the effect of this on small and large 
44 shareholders alike. However, there is no doubt in my mind that this action steadied 
45 and strengthened our position at a critical point. 
  
46 I am pleased that we have been able to resume dividend payments promptly. The  
47 dividend for the fourth quarter of 2010, to be paid in March 2011, is 7 cents per 
48 share (US$0.42 per ADS). The scrip dividend programme approved last year is in 
49 operation once again, and this presents an opportunity to take the dividend in 
50 shares or ADSs rather than cash. We intend to raise the level of the dividend as the 
51 company’s circumstances and performance improve. 
  
52 During the year we further reinforced our financial position. Having taken a total 
pre- 
53 tax charge of $40.9 billion in relation to the accident and spill, we announced our 
54 intention to sell up to $30 billion of assets. We have already secured almost $22 
 16 
 
55 billion. We intend to reduce the net debt ratio to within the range of 10-20%, 
56 compared with our previously targeted range of 20-30%. 
  
57 We have made significant changes to the board and I want to acknowledge Tony  
58 Hayward and Andy Inglis, who have left the company. Tony stood down as group 
59 chief executive on 1 October 2010. The board was saddened to lose someone 
60 whose long-term contribution to BP was so widely admired. Andy Inglis stood down 
61 on 31 October 2010. Andy was a strong leader of Exploration and Production and a 
62 significant contributor to the board. 
  
63 BP is fortunate to have an exceptional successor to the role of group chief  
64 executive. Bob Dudley has spent his working life in the oil industry and has proved 
65 himself a robust, successful leader in the toughest circumstances. I am delighted to 
66 be working alongside a man of such substance and experience. 
  
67 Douglas Flint will be standing down at the annual general meeting in April 2011,  
68 having taken up a new role as chairman of HSBC Holdings plc. Douglas has chaired 
69 our audit committee for the past year. DeAnne Julius will be standing down at the 
70 same time, having joined the board in 2001. DeAnne has chaired the remuneration 
71 committee since 2005 and is succeeded in that role by Antony Burgmans. Both 
72 DeAnne and Douglas have been immensely valuable board members. We thank 
73 them and wish them both well. 
  
74 Boards must evolve if they are to engage effectively with new issues and 
75 opportunities. We have acted to strengthen the board of BP to ensure we have the 
76 right mix of skills, knowledge and experience as we work to achieve sustainable 
77 success in a fast-changing world. In early 2010 we appointed Paul Anderson and 
78 Ian Davis as non-executive directors. We have since made three further non- 
79 executive appointments. Admiral Frank L ‘Skip’ Bowman is former head of the US 
80 Nuclear Navy and was a member of the Baker Panel that reviewed safety at BP’s 
81 US refineries. We will benefit from his exceptional experience on safety matters and 
82 his knowledge of BP. Brendan Nelson brings vast financial and auditing experience 
83 from KPMG, where latterly he was vice chairman. He is eminently well qualified to 
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84 take over the chair of the audit committee following the annual general meeting. 
85 Phuthuma Nhleko will bring deep experience of emerging markets, gained while he 
86 was group president and chief executive officer of multinational telephony company 
87 MTN Group. 
  
88 Clearly, after a very troubled and demanding 12 months, BP is a changed company.  
89 As a board we have much to do, and we are working with the executive team to 
90 ensure successful implementation of a refocused strategy built on the pillars of 
91 safety, trust and value creation. Foremost is the need to ensure the right checks and 
92 balances are in place across the company. The full board will continue to maintain 
93 close oversight of matters related to safety. And we will have even greater 
94 engagement on the strategic implications of risk. 
  
95 Looking ahead, we believe that a growing population and rising levels of prosperity  
96 will create strong demand for energy. BP’s ability to produce oil and gas from harsh 
97 environments means we have a vital contribution to make here. We will also  
98 continue to respond to climate change, and to the prospect of fossil fuels becoming  
99 a smaller part of the energy mix. For these reasons, BP must continue to be a  
100 leader in high-quality hydrocarbons today, while developing the intelligent options  
101 we will all rely on tomorrow. Lower-carbon resources remain central to this long- 
102 term strategy. 
  
103 BP is able to help meet the world’s growing need for energy, but we can only do this 
104 if we have the trust of society. To achieve this, we must ensure that safety and 
105 responsibility are at the heart of everything we do. We must show that we can be 
106 trusted to understand and manage our risks. And we must demonstrate that we 
107 respect the environment and the needs of local communities and society as a 
108 whole. 
  
109 The many strengths of BP are united in our remarkable people, who showed in 2010  
110 that they can rise to the sternest challenge. I thank them for their efforts. 
  
111 While we face substantial challenges, shareholders must be in no doubt – BP has  
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112 the determination and strength needed to restore its reputation and deliver long- 
113 term shareholder value. Through its refocused strategy, the company is working to 
114 become more agile and more competitive, with strong emphasis on realizing value  
115 rather than building volume and scale. We will not be afraid to develop new and  
116 innovative approaches that redefine the model of an international oil company, as  
117 our recently announced partnerships with Rosneft and Reliance demonstrate. 
  
118 I want to end by thanking shareholders for their support. You have been steadfast  
119 through one of the most testing periods in BP’s long history. We have learned many  
120 lessons about ourselves over the past 12 months, and these will never be forgotten.  
121 I believe we will emerge a stronger, wiser company with a very important role to  
122 play, for many years to come. 
  
123 Carl-Henric Svanberg  
124 Chairman 
125 2 March 2011 
 
(Adapted from BP plc Annual Report 2010, pp.6-7) 
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Text 2 – Group Chief Executive Officer’s Letter 
 
1 Group chief executive’s letter 
2 Dear fellow shareholder 
3 The tragic events of 2010 will forever be written in the memory of this company and 
4 the people who work here. The explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon rig 
5 shocked everyone within BP, and we feel great sadness that 11 people died. We  
6 are deeply sorry for the grief felt by their families and friends. We know nothing can  
7 restore the loss of those men. 
  
8 The accident on 20 April 2010 turned into an unprecedented oil spill with deep  
9 consequences for jobs, businesses, communities, the environment and our industry.  
10 From this grew a corporate crisis that threatened the very existence of the company.  
11 And it all started in a part of the world that’s very close to my heart. I grew up in  
12 Mississippi, and spent summers with my family swimming and fishing in the Gulf. I  
13 know those beaches and waters well. When I heard about the accident I could  
14 immediately picture how it might affect the people who live and work along that  
15 coast. 
  
16 Yet, just days before the accident, I had been reflecting on the progress made by  
17 BP. The company had put safe and reliable operations at the centre of everything,  
18 and we had turned a corner on financial performance. Then came the unthinkable. A  
19 subsea blowout in deep water was seen as a very, very low-probability event, by BP  
20 and the entire industry – but it happened. 
  
21 Following the accident, a search-and-rescue operation was carried out by the rig’s  
22 owner, Transocean, together with BP and the US Coast Guard. This continued for  
23 four days and covered 5,000 square miles. On 22 April 2010 the Deepwater Horizon  
24 sank, and a major oil spill response was activated. At its peak this involved the  
25 mobilization of some 48,000 people, the deployment of around 2,500 miles of boom  
26 and the co-ordination of more than 6,500 vessels. Field operations brought together  
27 experts from key agencies, organizations and BP. Thousands of our people flew in  
28 from around the world and stayed and worked for weeks and months. Nearly 500  
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29 retirees from BP America called up to say they wanted to help. This was an  
30 extraordinary response. 
  
31 As the response developed, the problems grew in complexity and scale. Tackling  
32 the leak on the seabed demanded groundbreaking technical advances and  
33 dauntless spirit. We also found ourselves in the midst of intense political and media  
34 scrutiny. We received incredible support and faced tremendous criticism, but our  
35 priorities remained clear – provide support to the families and friends of those 11  
36 men who died, stop the leak, attack the spill, protect the shore, support all the  
37 people and places affected. We also committed to carry out an immediate and  
38 detailed internal investigation.  
  
39 As a responsible party, under the Oil Pollution Act, we knew we would face wide-  
40 ranging claims and potential fines, but we resolved to go beyond what the law  
41 required of us. We made swift payments to support local economies, and gave a  
42 total of $138 million in direct state grants during 2010, which included behavioural  
43 health programmes. We set up the $20-billion Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust to  
44 meet individual, business, government, local and state claims, and natural resource  
45 damages. We provided $500 million for the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative, 
which  
46 is funding independent research to investigate impacts on affected ecosystems. And  
47 we contributed to a $100-million fund to support rig workers hit by the drilling  
48 moratorium. 
  
49 To meet our financial commitments, we announced the sale of up to $30 billion in  
50 assets and, by the end of 2010, had agreed to $22 billion of disposals. We have  
51 also cut back on discretionary capital spending and secured additional credit lines.  
52 The sound underlying performance across our business continues to give us a solid  
53 foundation, and speaks volumes for the inner strengths of BP and our people. 
  
54 As part of our response, we took the decision to cancel further dividends in 2010.  
55 While we know that many shareholders rely on their regular payments, we also had  
56 to protect the company and secure its long-term future. The board of BP took this  
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57 decision with a heavy heart, but I believe it was the right thing to do in truly  
58 exceptional circumstances. 
  
59 Our investigation report was published on 8 September 2010, and found that no  
60 single factor caused the accident. The report stated that decisions made by multiple  
61 companies and work teams contributed to the accident, and these arose from a  
62 complex and interlinked series of mechanical, human judgement, engineering  
63 design, operational implementation and team interface failures. 
  
64 We have accepted and are implementing the report’s recommendations. We are  
65 also sharing what we have learned with governments and others in our industry, and  
66 we are co-operating with a series of other investigations, inquiries and hearings. 
  
67 2010 stands as an inflexion point for BP and our industry, and it is right that we  
68 should help lead the development of better ways to operate in deep water. Good  
69 risk identification and management is integral to becoming safer, and we are  
70 working with governments, service contractors and industry peers to take risk  
71 management and equipment design to the next level. Within BP, we have  
72 introduced more layers of protection and resilience, with our new safety and  
73 operational risk function empowered to intervene in any operation. To enhance our  
74 specialist expertise and risk management, we have re-organized our upstream  
75 business into three divisions – Exploration, Developments and Production. To  
76 encourage excellence in risk management throughout the organization, we are  
77 reviewing how we incentivize and reward people. And to think hard about what was  
78 previously unthinkable, we are looking further afield for insight and wisdom. I have  
79 spent time with experts from the nuclear and chemicals industries, and I am  
80 convinced that we in the energy industry have much to learn from them and others.  
81 We must take what we learn and embed it deep in the fabric of our organization. 
  
82 Part of BP’s task right now is to show we can be trusted to handle the industry’s  
83 most demanding jobs, including exploration and production in deep water. Around 
84 7% of the world’s oil supplies come from this source, and we expect this will rise to  
85 nearly 10% by 2020. We are one of only a handful of companies with the financial  
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86 and technological strengths needed to operate in these geographies. Before April  
87 2010, BP had drilled safely in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico for 20 years.  
88 The governments of Egypt, China, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and the UK have shown  
89 confidence in our ability to operate safely at depths, having signed new deepwater  
90 drilling agreements with us in the second half of 2010. 
  
91 It is important to remember why companies such as BP have to take on the risks  
92 they do. Around 40 years ago, international oil companies had access to the  
93 majority of the world’s oil reserves. Today these companies can access a much  
94 smaller share. This still provides substantial opportunities for value creation, but  
95 reaching many of those reserves requires us to overcome severe physical,  
96 technical, intellectual and geopolitical challenges. Global energy demand continues  
97 to rise, so the world needs BP and others to meet these challenges in an  
98 environmentally sustainable way. In doing this, we can never eliminate every  
99 hazard, but we can become an industry leader in understanding and limiting risk.  
100 That’s our goal. 
  
101 Clearly, one of the consequences of the events of 2010 was a substantial loss of  
102 value and returns for our shareholders. I am pleased that we have been able to  
103 resume dividend payments, and our intention is to grow the dividend level in line  
104 with the company’s improving circumstances. We are now taking action to create  
105 and realize greater value. We are increasing our investment in exploration, which is  
106 one of our distinctive strengths. 
  
107 We are gaining access to a wide range of new upstream resource opportunities, and  
108 already have 32 project start-ups planned between now and 2016. We are taking an  
109 even more active approach to buying, developing and selling upstream assets, with  
110 a focus on maximizing returns rather than building volume. And we are divesting  
111 roughly half of our US refining capacity, so we can focus downstream investments  
112 on refining positions and marketing businesses where we have competitive  
113 advantage. This builds on the success BP’s Refining and Marketing business has  
114 achieved in driving itself back to significantly improved performance and returns  
115 over the past few years. 
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116 In short, BP is moving swiftly to address its weaknesses and build on its strengths.  
117 While doing this we will not hesitate to go beyond the conventional business model  
118 of an international oil company. Since 2003 we have had a strong alliance onshore  
119 in Russia with TNK-BP. In January 2011 we announced our Arctic alliance with  
120 Rosneft, which further shows our strategy in action. Pending completion, this is  
121 expected to be the first major equity-linked partnership between a national and  
122 international oil company, with an agreement with Rosneft to receive 5% of BP’s  
123 ordinary voting shares in exchange for approximately 9.5% of Rosneft’s shares.  
124 Under the agreement, Rosneft and BP will seek to form a joint venture to explore  
125 and, if successful, develop three licence blocks in the South Kara Sea – an area  
126 roughly equivalent in size and prospectivity to the UK North Sea. BP and Rosneft  
127 have also agreed to establish an Arctic technology centre in Russia, which will work  
128 with research institutes, design bureaus and universities to develop technologies  
129 and engineering practices for the safe extraction of hydrocarbon resources from the  
130 Arctic shelf. 
  
131 In February 2011 we announced a second historic agreement. This will, subject to  
132 completion, see BP and Reliance work together across the gas value chain in the  
133 fast-growing Indian market. This major strategic alliance will combine BP’s  
134 deepwater capabilities with Reliance’s project management and operations  
135 expertise. 
  
136 BP is also partnering with another organization, Husky Energy, to develop a further  
137 important resource of energy – Canada’s oil sands. These represent the second  
138 largest reserves in the world after the oilfields of Saudi Arabia. We will work with 
this  
139 resource in a way that fits with our long-term responsibilities and objectives, using  
140 steam assisted gravity drainage to extract the oil, and an efficient, integrated system  
141 to transport it. Our approach will have a relatively small footprint and should not be. 
142 confused with opencast mining – we will not engage in mining. On a well-to-wheel  
143 basis, greenhouse gas emissions from Canadian oil produced this way are expected  
144 to be slightly higher than those from conventional crudes imported to North America. 
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145 Along with providing the hydrocarbons required over coming years, we are helping  
146 to build the sustainable options needed to meet growing demand for lower-carbon  
147 energy. Our natural gas operations will help to provide a lower-carbon bridge from  
148 oil and coal to renewables. We are building a material business to produce biofuels  
149 in Brazil, the US and the UK. We are becoming a leading player in wind energy. We  
150 have a long-established solar business. And we have made substantial investments  
151 in carbon-capture-and-storage technology. Lower-carbon resources are the fastest- 
152 growing sector in the energy market, and BP intends to develop its portfolio in step  
153 with this growth. 
  
154 As to the immediate future, I expect 2011 to be a year of consolidation for BP, as we  
155 focus on completing our previously announced divestment programme, meeting our  
156 commitments in the US and bringing renewed rigour to the way we manage risk.  
157 There will also be an increasing emphasis on value over volume, as we sharpen our  
158 strategy and reshape the company for growth. 
  
159 Looking back over recent days and months, our thoughts return to the men who lost  
160 their lives, to those who were injured and to the communities hit hard by the spill. I  
161 have heard people ask “Does BP ‘get it’?” Residents of the Gulf, our employees and  
162 investors, governments, industry partners and people around the world all want to  
163 know whether we understand that a return to business-as-usual is not an option. We  
164 may not have communicated it enough at times, but yes, we get it. Our fundamental  
165 purpose is to create value for shareholders, but we also see ourselves as part of  
166 society, not apart from it. Put simply, our role is to find and turn energy resources  
167 into financial returns, but by doing that in the right way we can help create a  
168 prosperous and sustainable future for everyone. This is what people rightfully expect  
169 of BP. This is what will inspire and drive us over the next 12 months and far into the  
170 future. 
  
171 Bob Dudley  
172 Group Chief Executive 
173 2 March 2011 
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(Adapted from BP plc Annual Report 2010, pp.10-11) 
 
